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N OWHERE is drought a more common feature of the American landscape than in the West. Droughts are well documented in the region's 
climatic record, and extended drought periods are indi-
cated in tree rings and other surrogates of climate. When 
settlers headed west in the middle of the 19th century, 
the high cost of those droughts began to be recorded as 
well. Coupled with drought occurrence have been 
repeated attempts to relieve the suffering and devasta-
tion caused by the most severe drought episodes. 
The history of drought relief in the West, and ulti-
mately the entire United States, began with the private 
sector and gradually moved to the government, especial-
ly the federal government. It is a history characterized 
by short-term, crisis-oriented approaches rather than by 
planning and proactive measures. Drought relief typical-
ly has been viewed as something to be dispensed after 
the event, and only to ameliorate drought's impacts. It 
was not until the mid-1930s that the idea of reducing 
vulnerability to drought was even voiced, and the con-
cept has made uneven progress since then. 
Severe drought events since the mid-to-late-1980s, 
particularly in the western United States, have raised 
awareness of this continuing vulnerability. The West 
experienced a devastating series of drought years from 
1986 to 1992, with California and Nevada experiencing 
seven and six consecutive years of drought, respectively. 
Drought returned to much of the West in 1994 and has 
repeated each year in at least a po1tion of the region. In 
1996, large sections of the Southwest, Great Basin, and 
central and southern Great Plains were affected. 
Widespread drought returned to the region in 1998, 
1999, and 2000, once again resulting in serious eco-
nomic, social, and environmental consequences. The 
escalating costs and heightened awareness of these 
drought impacts emphasize that we have not yet made 
the transition to proactive drought management with a 
focus on preparedness and mitigation. 
If we are to make progress in preparing for and miti-
gating the effects of future drought, we must develop a 
better understanding of its characteristics (i.e., fre-
quency, severity, and patterns). It is equally important to 
develop a better understanding of who and what is most 
at risk and what actions can be taken to reduce the risk 
from future drought events. In the West, increasing and 
shifting population is placing greater pressure on water 
and other natural resources, but government policies do 
not always promote wise management of those re-
sources. One fact is clear: continuing to address drought 
impacts through government-sponsored emergency 
assistance programs will not decrease the vulnerability 
of the West or other portions of the United States to 
future drought events. Reducing the risk of drought for 
future generations requires greater investments in pre-
paredness and mitigation. 
In discussing the history of drought and relief efforts 
in the West during the settlement and post-settlement 
periods, as well as current trends in drought manage-
ment, emphasis will be given to the West. However, res-
olution of drought management planning and policy 
issues must also be addressed at the national, state, and 
local levels. Drought's impacts are distinctly regional in 
nature, but drought affects virtually all areas of the 
nation. Improving drought management will require a 
coordinated effort among local, state, federal, and tribal 
governments. 
Drought Relief in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
The settlers who populated the Great Plains and other 
parts of the West after 1850 had little prior knowledge of 
the area's climate. Several expeditions had explored the 
region, but the information they gathered was primarily 
for the government, not the general public,1 and "boost-
ers" of the region provided glowing but inaccurate ac-
counts of the Great Plains' agricultural potential. Most 
settlers had little money and few possessions, and their 
farming experience was acquired in the more humid 
East, so the crops and cultivation practices they chose 
were not necessarily compatible with the Great Plains 
environment. Because the earliest settlements occurred 
during a wet cycle, however, these shortcomings were 
not immediately apparent. When the inevitable droughts 
and harsh winters occurred, economic hardship and hu-
man suffering immediately followed. Just as quickly, it 
seemed, the early settlers forgot the lessons learned once 
the rains returned. Although adverse conditions forced 
many settlers to return to the Eastern United States, 
many more continued to push west, and the idea that the 
climate of the Great Plains was changing, particularly in 
response to human settlement, was popularly accepted. 
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It was not until the last years of the 19th century that this 
idea was abandoned and more realistic agricultural 
options were explored.2 In the interim, repeated droughts 
tested the settlers and the ingenuity of local and state 
governments that were struggling to survive. 
For a variety of reasons, drought relief came primari-
ly from private organizations in the 19th century, and it 
was not universally accepted. Government, particularly 
federal, and those who stood to gain financially from 
settlement of the Great Plains were generally opposed to 
relief efforts. Many people had much at stake in the 
newly settled Great Plains and were afraid that reports of 
drought distress would filter back East and discourage 
immigration. Because of this, news about famine was 
often suppressed, and it was private interests that pro-
vided some of the earliest drought relief, via an organi-
zation known as the Territorial Relief Committee in 
Kansas in the early 1860s.3 The federal government, 
despite its negative view of providing aid, did have some 
direct involvement in drought relief. In 1875, the newly 
formed Nebraska State Relief and Aid Society received 
congressional approval to distribute Army surplus cloth-
ing and food to more than 100,000 persons in Minne-
sota, Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado.4 In 
general, however, the federal government did not regard 
drought relief as a federal responsibility; this was made 
clear when President Grover Cleveland vetoed a con-
gressional appropriation for seed for drought-stricken 
Texas in 1887 on the grounds that the government had 
neither the power nor the duty to provide relief and that 
to do so would weaken character. 5 
Territorial, state, and local governments found them-
selves in a difficult situation. They had a great stake in 
attracting more settlers, because a greater number of 
people meant economic resources and the ability to ex-
ploit the natural wealth of the region. 6 Although state 
and territorial Legislatures often rejected direct relief 
measures, they could not escape providing aid altogeth-
er - usually in the form of funds for either seed grains 
or for payment of freight charges for bringing items col-
lected through private relief. But it was clear that private 
charity was still a major component of relief efforts 
toward the end of the 19th century. In Nebraska and 
Colorado, many settlers received privately donated sup-
plies worth thousands of dollars, and Nebraska's State 
Relief Commission collected cash donations of about 
$29,000 in 1895.7 
The federal government made its first drought disas-
ter loans during the Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge ad-
ministrations, beginning with a 1918 measure provid-
ing $5 million to farmers for seed loans.8 When the 
severe droughts of the 1930s struck, President Her-
bert Hoover's administration also authorized federal ex-
penditures, but Hoover's initial approach essentially 
Hungry Horse Reservoir, Montana, May 1988, with water levels showing the effects of the dry 1987-1988 winter. Photo by Donald Wilhite 
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emphasized the 19th-century tradition of nongovern-
ment relief and voluntary contributions. In December 
1930, Hoover persuaded the Red Cross to direct drought 
relief measures, although its involvement was not on the 
large scale that the President had envisioned.9 The sever-
ity of the drought, however, finally forced the federal 
government into the relief picture, and the President 
i! eventually supported bills providing funds for crop pro-1 duction loans as well as feed and seed loans. 10 The 
:<! Hoover administration marked the end of the "self-help" 
~ approach to drought. 
~ The early years of the Roosevelt administration rep-
P-"' ~ resented a major turning point in federal drought-relief 
~ efforts. Federal involvement increased dramatically: 
c: more than $500 million was appropriated for drought 
Oil: g relief in 1934,11 and the federal government assumed 
Si: complete authority for drought relief. A more compre-
~ hensive federal drought-relief organization was <level-~. oped to deal with problems of distress; this included the 
EW··· development of procedures for drought disaster-area 
designation and numerous drought response/planning 
activities. Numerous long-term measures, such as the 
consolidation of soil programs under a single agency 
(the Soil Conservation Service) and the Shelterbelt 
Project, also were implemented during the Roosevelt 
administration to reduce the vulnerability of the Great 
Plains to future droughts. 
Drought once again plagued the Great Plains in the 
1950s. The Eisenhower administration reluctantly 
became involved in a drought-relief program; 12 the 
President's advisors suggested that he follow the prece-
dent set by Grover Cleveland in 1887, when Cleveland 
vetoed the congressional appropriation for drought relief 
in Texas. But the precedent set by Roosevelt was too 
strong for Eisenhower to ignore completely. Instead, the 
Eisenhower administration emphasized that states 
should share the cost of relief measures and that local 
and state government should assume a greater role in 
relieving hardships created by drought. Federal partici-
pation would occur only as a supplement to local re-
sources, and the President stressed the importance of 
research and long-range programs to stabilize the econ-
omy of areas frequently affected by severe drought. By 
the end of the 1950s drought, federal expenditures for 
emergency and short-term measures totaled an esti-
mated $1 to $1.5 billion; the government had also begun 
long-term programs like the Great Plains Conservation 
Program (authorized in 1958), various economic assis-
tance programs, industrial development (to diversify the 
drought region's economy), and water resources plan-
ning.13 
Although the drought of the 1974-1977 period in the 
United States was widespread and severe, it was not 
comparable to the 1930s or the 1950s droughts in inten-
sity, duration, or spatial extent for most of the nation. Its 
most serious impacts were experienced in the Far West 
and Upper Midwest states. During the Ford administra-
tion, no new programs were developed and no coordi-
nated effort was initiated to respond to deteriorating 
conditions. In January 1977, as the Carter administra-
tion took office, states began to form regional alliances 
to put political pressure on Washington for action. Gov-
ernors of Western states met with Interior Secretary 
Cecil Andrus to discuss needs and federal actions to 
mitigate drought impact; it was the first joint discus-
sion of mitigation alternatives by state and federal offi-
cials. 
In response, the Carter administration created a pres-
idential drought package that provided $844 million in 
loans and grants to farmers, ranchers, communities, and 
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President Jimmy Carter's Proposed Drought Program, March 23, 1977* 
Title Purpose/Description Amount 
Emergency Loans Program 5% loans to cover prospective losses to $100,000,000 
(Farmers Home Administration) farmers and ranchers 
Community Program Loans $150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in $225,000,000 
(Farmers Home Administration) grants to communities of less than 10,000 
for emergency water supplies 
Emergency Conservation Soil conservation cost-sharing grants $100,000,000 
Measures Program 
(Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service) 
FCIC Insurance (Federal Increase FCIC capital stock $100,000,000 
Crop Insurance Corporation) 
Drought Emergency Program Creation of water bank, protection of fish $100,000,000 
(Bureau of Reclamation) and wildlife, grants to states, 5% for water 
supply and conservation measures 
Emergency Fund Emergency irrigation loans $30,000,000 
(Bureau of Reclamation) 
Emergency Power Purchase of emergency power supply $14,000,000 
(Southwest Power Administration) 
Community Emergency $150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in $225,000,000** 
Drought-Relief Program grants to communities of more than 10,000 
(Economic Development Administration) for emergency water supply 
Physical Loss and Economic Injury Low-interest loans for small businessmen $50,000,000*** 
Loans (Small Business Administration) (including farmers) 
TOTAL Amount Requested $944,000,000 
Amount Appropriated $844,000,000 
* Cited in Managing Resource Scarcity: Lessons from the Mid-Seventies Drought, Western Governors' Policy Office, Denver, CO. 
** Only $175 million of this amount was finally appropriated. 
*** Action on this proposal resulted in the lowering of interest rates for Physical Loss and Economic Injury Loans (both ongoing, 
funded programs), but none of the additional appropriation originally requested was granted. 
businesses stricken by drought. Yet this package was 
only a small portion of the total drought assistance 
program. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Interior and the Small Business Administration 
administered more than $5 billion in drought-relief pro-
grams to water users during 1976-1977.14 
The processes for distributing these funds proved 
complex and confusing. The General Accounting 
Office, in a study of the 1976-1977 federal drought 
response effort, identified several of the problems: pro-
grams enacted too late to lessen the effects of drought; 
inconsistent, inequitable, and confusing program 
requirements; and inadequate coordination among agen-
cies, which led to program overlap and nonuniform stan-
dards. The GAO report recommended that a national 
drought plan be developed to provide assistance in a 
more timely, consistent, and equitable manner. 
The 1987-1989 drought period was costly, incurring 
total losses during 1988 of $39 billion, according to the 
Interagency Drought Policy Committee. 15 By 1988, 
drought was widespread across most of the West, north-
ern Great Plains, Midwest, and Southeast. Once again 
government agencies responded through a reactive crisis 
management approach. In 1988, many of the agencies 
responsible for monitoring climate-sensitive resources 
apparently were not prepared and did not recognize the 
serious nature of the drought early enough. 16 Most agen-
cies did not begin to respond to the drought until mid-
summer, and it was not until late June or early July 1988 
that the federal government began a response effort. 
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Existing U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) disas-
ter assistance programs were modified and elaborated, 
and an emergency feed program was implemented. By 
August, the need for additional assistance, beyond those 
programs already in existence, led Congress to pass the 
Disaster Assistance Act of 1988; the cost of this legisla-
tion, which provided further assistance to livestock pro-
ducers, was estimated at $3 .9 billion. 17 
This response effort did address the worst of the 
drought's impacts, but its activities were reactionary in 
nature, and the general lack of coordination and plan-
ning caused problems. In their study of the impacts of 
the 1987-1989 drought, W. E. Riebsame, et al., 18 sug-
gested the development of a better drought watch sys-
tem, an evaluation of drought indices, the development 
and application of climate-impact models in a coordi-
nated fashion, and new contingency plans for critical 
resource systems as means of improving drought-
response efforts. 
Since 1994, drought has been a common feature of 
the Western landscape. The period from 1995 to 2000, in 
particular, has been characterized by dramatic and com-
plex economic, social, and environmental impacts 
throughout the nation. 19 In 1995, a severe drought devel-
oped in portions of western Texas and New Mexico, car-
rying over into 1996 in these states and expanding into 
Arizona, central and eastern Texas, and parts of Califor-
nia, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas. 
Impacts included range fires, with Colorado alone expe-
riencing nearly 68,000 fires over more than 2 million 
acres;20 depleted groundwater supplies, resulting in 
water-use restrictions in cities across the region; agricul-
tural losses, estimated at $5 billion in Texas alone;21 and 
decreased ski resort revenues. Food prices in turn re-
sponded to the lower production levels for milk, meat, 
produce, and other foodstuffs; 22 the price of fruit, for 
example, increased more than 22 percent in June. Envi-
ronmental damages also began to emerge as endangered 
species were affected and landscapes were eroded. 23 
There are no official estimates of the total losses and 
damages from the 1996 drought, but given the $5 billion 
in impacts that occurred in Texas, total regional impacts 
could be safely estimated in the $10 to $15 billion range, 
although this figure does not include social and environ-
mental impacts, which are difficult to quantify. What 
was remarkable was the significant level of regional vul-
nerability, the diversity of impacts, and the lack of pre-
paredness to respond to these impacts. Many of the 
states in this region have now initiated longer-term 
planning efforts directed at improving mitigation and 
preparedness efforts: New Mexico and Oklahoma devel-
oped drought plans, Texas and Arizona initiated plan-
ning efforts, and Utah revised an existing drought plan. 
Future Directions for 
Drought Management in the United States 
The legacy of the 1996 drought is not likely to be its 
impacts but rather the policy initiatives that occurred in 
the post-drought period. These initiatives appear to be 
changing the way droughts are viewed, and they may 
change the way droughts are managed in the United 
States. The real question at this point is whether these 
changes will result in permanent and substantive modi-
fications in the way government entities deal with 
drought. 
In June 1996, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) was asked to chair a multi-state 
drought task force to address the drought situation in the 
Southwest and southern Great Plains states. The purpose 
of the task force was to coordinate federal response to 
drought-related problems in the stricken region by iden-
tifying needs, applicable programs, and program barri-
ers. The task force was also directed to suggest ways to 
improve drought management through both short- and 
long-term national actions. The final report of this task 
force contained several important long-term recommen-
dations. 24 First, the task force called for the development 
of a national drought policy based on the philosophy of 
cooperation with state and local stakeholders. This pol-
icy should include a national climate/drought monitor-
ing system to provide early warning of the onset and 
severity of drought to federal, state, and local officials. 
Second, it was suggested that a regional forum be 
created to assess regional needs and resources, identify 
critical areas and interests, provide reliable and timely 
information, and coordinate state actions. Third, FEMA 
was asked to include drought as one of the natural haz-
ards addressed in the National Mitigation Strategy,25 
given the substantial costs associated with its occurrence 
and the numerous opportunities available to mitigate its 
effects. FEMA's 1995 report had estimated annual losses 
due to drought at $6 to $8 billion. Fourth, states strong-
ly requested that a single federal agency be appointed to 
coordinate drought preparedness and response and that 
FEMA be given this responsibility. FEMA suggested 
that the USDA be the agency in charge, given its pro-
gram responsibilities in agriculture, often the first sector 
affected. 
Another important initiative resulting from the 1996 
drought was the development of a drought task force 
under the leadership of the Western Governors' Asso-
ciation (WGA). This task force was formed in June 1996 
as a result of a resolution offered by Governor Gary 
Johnson of New Mexico that emphasized the importance 
of a comprehensive, integrated drought response. 26 The 
WGA Drought Task Force's report made several impor-
tant recommendations. First, a national drought policy 
or framework should be developed that integrates 
actions and responsibilities among all levels of govern-
ment and emphasizes preparedness, response, and miti-
gation measures. Second, each state should be encour-
aged to develop a drought contingency plan that in-
cludes early warning, triggers, and short- and long-term 
planning, and mitigation measures. Third, a regional 
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Status of Drought Planning, January 2001 
m States with plans emphasizing response 
• States with plans emphasizing mitigation 
D States developing long-term plans 
g States delegating drought planning to local authorities 
D States without drought plans 
Status of state drought plans, January 2001. To date, 30 states have drought plans, with another 6 states at various stages of plan develop-
ment. Of the 30 with plans, most emphasize response; 3 states have plans that emphasize mitigation. (Map based on surveys of state agen-
cies conducted by the National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.) 
drought coordinating council should be created to de-
velop sustainable policy, monitor drought conditions, 
assess state-level responses, identify impacts and issues 
for resolution, and work in partnership with the federal 
government to address drought-related needs. Fourth, a 
federal interagency coordinating group should be estab-
lished with a designated lead agency for drought coor-
dination with states and regional agencies. 
A number of important policy initiatives have re-
sulted from the FEMA and WGA reports. A memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU) was signed in early 1997 
between the WGA and the Departments of Agriculture, 
Interior, and Commerce; FEMA; and the Small Business 
Administration, calling for a partnership among federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments to reduce drought 
impacts in the Western United States. This MOU re-
sulted in the following actions: (1) the Western Drought 
Coordination Council (WDCC) was formed to address 
the recommendations of the Western governors;27 (2) 
USDA was designated as the lead federal agency for 
drought to carry out the objectives of the MOU; and (3) 
USDA established a federal interagency drought coordi-
nating group. 
Another initiative of considerable relevance was the 
reexamination of Western water policy by the Western 
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission. This 
Commission was created by the passage of the Western 
Water Policy Act of 1992 by the U.S. Congress (Public 
Law 102-575). One of the reports of this Commission 
summarized recommendations from recent studies on 
drought management that should be incorporated in 
future attempts to integrate drought management and 
water policy in the West.28 The consensus from the 
reports reviewed in this study emphasized the need to 
create a national drought policy and plan, develop a 
national climate-monitoring system, incorporate 
drought in FEMA's National Drought Mitigation 
Strategy, conduct post-drought audits of federal/state 
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response efforts, establish regional drought forums, and 
encourage development of state drought mitigation 
plans. Although impacts of drought occur mainly at the 
local, state, and regional levels, this study concluded that 
it was imperative for the federal government to provide 
the leadership necessary to improve the way the nation 
prepares for and responds to drought. 
The National Drought Policy Act of 1998 was passed 
by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton in July 
1998 (Public Law 105-199). This bill created the 
National Drought Policy Commission (NDPC) whose 
task was to make recommendations to the President and 
Congress on the development of a national drought pol-
icy. The NDPC's report recommended that the United 
States establish a national drought policy emphasizing 
preparedness.29 The goals of this policy would be to (1) 
incorporate planning, proactive mitigation measures, 
risk management, resource stewardship, environmental 
considerations, and public education; (2) improve col-
laboration among scientists and managers to enhance 
observation networks, monitoring, prediction, informa-
tion delivery, and applied research and to foster public 
understanding of and preparedness for drought; (3) 
incorporate comprehensive insurance and financial 
strategies into drought preparedness plans; (4) maintain 
a safety net of emergency relief that emphasizes sound 
stewardship of natural resources and self-help; and (5) 
coordinate drought programs and resources. At this writ-
ing, the recommendations of the NDPC report are under 
consideration. 
Actions taken since 1996 to improve drought man-
agement in the United States have had little effect so far 
- especially at the federal level, as verified by the fed-
eral response to drought conditions in 1999 and 2000. 
Instead, it has been the states that have been progressive 
in the past two decades in drought-plan development: 30 
states have drought plans and another 6 states are at var-
ious stages of plan development. Since 1996, some 
states have revised or developed drought plans that place 
more emphasis on mitigation. Federal agencies are now 
speaking the new language of drought management, and 
phrases like "improved coordination and cooperation," 
"increased emphasis on mitigation and preparedness," 
and "building nonfederal/federal partnerships" have 
become commonplace. However, the existing federal 
emergency response infrastructure encourages drought 
management to remain in a reactive crisis management 
mode, and the mentality of both state and federal gov-
ernment clearly remains response oriented. Whether 
federal and state policymakers clearly understand the 
scope of the changes that will be required to invoke the 
new paradigm of risk management is not apparent at this 
time. When drought conditions exist, especially in elec-
tion years, drought relief is one method that members of 
Congress use to send money home to their constituents. 
The true test of whether we are making progress will be 
if Congress and the administration enthusiastically 
embrace the recommendations of the NDPC and other 
groups, provide adequate funding to support the NDPC 
goals and recommendations, and direct federal agencies 
to modify existing policies and programs to emphasize 
mitigation and preparedness, thus effectively shifting 
funding from crisis to risk management. 
Conclusions 
Drought, a normal part of the climate for virtually all 
regions of the United States, is an even more common 
menace in the West. Likewise, drought relief has 
become a common feature of the Western (and national) 
landscape. Shaped over the course of the past century 
and a half, this relief occurs primarily under a diverse, 
complex, confusing, and poorly coordinated ensemble 
of federal programs. It is reactive and does little to 
lessen the risks associated with future drought episodes. 
The wide-ranging and complex web of impacts associ-
ated with drought clearly indicate land and agricultural 
resource management practices that are nonsustainable 
in the long term, especially given the variable climate of 
the region. 
In the past several decades, there have been numerous 
calls for increased attention to drought planning and a 
reduced emphasis on government-sponsored emergency 
assistance programs. The frustration over the complexi-
ty of impacts and our inability to respond effectively to 
recent drought events has only served to fuel these calls 
for action. The new paradigm - shifting from crisis to 
risk management - has been received with varying 
degrees of acceptance by state and federal agencies. 
Only time will determine the dedication of the nation to 
this new approach to drought management. A continua-
tion of widespread, severe drought in the next few years 
would certainly engender greater support for this new 
paradigm. The political will to change the way we man-
age drought appears to be genuine, but may evaporate 
quickly if a series of wet years occurs. Changing the 
momentum of the past will be a difficult obstacle to 
overcome, but it is critical for the scientific community 
and the public to hold policymakers to this commitment. 
NOTES 
1. G. C. Fite, The Farmer's Frontier, 1865-1900 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 
2. Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A 
History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1991). 
3. J. G. Gambone, "Economic Relief in Territorial Kansas, 1860-
1861," Kansas Historical Quarterly, 36 (1970): 149-174. 
4. Fite, The Farmer's Frontier. 
5. L. K. Dyson, History of Federal Drought Relief Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, Agriculture and Rural Economy 
Division. ERS Staff Report No. AGES880914, 1988). 
6. Fite, The Farmer's Frontier. 
7.1bid. 
8. Dyson, History of Federal Drought Relief Programs. 
9. N. E. Woodrnff, As Rare as Rain: Federal Relief in the Great 
Southern Drought of 1930-31 (Urbana and Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 1985). 
Wilhite and Wood: Revisiting Drought Relief and Management Efforts in the West JOW, Summer 2001, Vol. 40, No. 3 - 25 
10. D. E. Hamilton, "Herbert Hoover and the Great Drought of 
1930," Journal of American History, 68 (1982): 850-875. 
20. C. Hillard, "Wildfire Threat," Associated Press, June 28, 1996. 
21. J. Fohn, Agriculture Column, San Antonio Express -News, Aug. 
21, 1996. 11. United States House of Representatives, "Relief of the drought 
area," Conuuunication from the President of the United States, 
73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Doc. No. 398 (Washington, D.C.: 
22. S. H. Lee, "Dairy Industry Cites Drought as Cause of Rising Milk 
Prices," Dallas Morning News, July 8, 1996; L. Canillo, "Labor 
Depaitment Confams What Consumers Know: Food P1ices 
Increasing," Sun-Sentinel (South Florida), July 14, 1996. 
GPO, 1934). 
12. Roger Lambert, "Drought, Texas Cattlemen, and Eisenhower," 
Journal of the West, 16, 1 (Jan. 1977): 66-70. 23. M. Holmes, "Battling Drought, Texas Biologists Try to Save 
Endangered Species," Southwest Sunday (San Marcos, TX), June 
27, 1996. 
13. United States Executive Office of the President, Drought: A 
Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959). 
14. General Accounting Office, Federal Response to the 1976-77 
Drought: What Should be Done Next? Report to the Comptroller 
General (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979). 
24. Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Drought of '96: 
Multi-State Drought Task Force Findings" (Washington, D.C.: 
FEMA, 1996). 
15. W. E. Riebsame, S. A. Changnon, and T. R. Karl, Drought and 
Natural Resources Management in the United States: Impacts 
and Implications of the 1987-89 Drought (Boulder, CO: 
25. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Mitigation 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: FEMA, 1995). 
26. Western Governors' Association, Drought Response Action Plan 
(Denver, CO: WGA, 1996). Westview Press, 1991). 
16. Jbid. 27. Ibid. 
17. Dyson, History of Federal Drought Relief Programs. 28. D. A. Wilhite, Improving Drought Management in the West, 
Report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory 
Commission (Denver, CO, 1997). 
18. Riebsame, 'et al., Drought and Natural Resources Management in 
the United States. 
19. D. A. Wilhite and 0. Vanyarkho, "Drought: Pervasive Impacts of 
a Creeping Phenomenon," in D. A. Wilhite, ed., Drought: A 
Global Assessment, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2000), 245-255. 
29. National Drought Policy Commission, Preparing for Drought in 
the 21st Century, Executive Summary, USDA (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 2000). 
Donald A. Wilhite is professor of agricultural climatol-
ogy in the School of Natural Resource Sciences at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is director of the 
National Drought Mitigation Center and the International 
Drought Information Center. Dr. Wilhite's research and 
outreach activities focus on issues of drought monitoring, 
planning, and mitigation, and in that capacity he works 
with U.S. and foreign governments and international organ-
izations. Dr. Wilhite is the editor of Drought: A Global 
Assessment, published in 2000 by Routledge Publishers as 
part of a seven-volume series on natural hazards and disas-
ters. He is editor of Drought Assessment, Management, and 
Planning: Theory and Case Studies, published by Kluwer 
Academic Press in 1993, and co-editor of Planning for Drought: Toward a Reduction 
of Societal Vulnerability, published by Westview Press in 1987. Dr. Wilhite has 
authored or co-authored more than 100 journal articles, monographs, book chapters, 
and technical reports in the past ten years. 
Deborah Wood is the publications specialist at the 
National Drought Mitigation Center (NDMC) at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. She is responsible for 
editing, layout, and design of NDMC publications, and for 
editing and managing other publications projects. She 
received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in history from 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
